Blue Green   Red Black Orange
Updates

Why the Zionist intelligence services failed to reach Shalit?

Why the Zionist intelligence services failed to reach Shalit?

Exclusive for Al Qassam website

It is no longer a secret that the Zionist enemy and its intelligence have failed to reach Shalit which led the enemy to negotiate with the resistance which captured Shalit? In order to maintain the Zionist entity's position and prestige in front of the force of resistance, it wanted to be a swap deal on its conditions as the stronger in the equation of the conflict, but this also did not happen, so the enemy's entity moved its arms by land, sea and air in a war of 23 days resulted in the intensification of the resistance and failure promises of access to Shalit.

Security reasons that led to the failure of the occupation in the access to Shalit:

1. The success of the security policy of the capturing factions:

Since the security measures adopted by the factions with regard to the file of Shalit has enabled it to prevent access of any information to the occupation in this regard, through the narrow circle of one faction know the details of the capturing operation which is Hamas (the most powerful in military and security).

The political and security awareness enjoyed by the faction, which enabled it to overcome the political and security booby traps laid by the enemy to push the resistance factions to any security mistake to help the occupation to obtain information about the file (security, military or political.. statements). This was done by the restriction of information about the file of Shalit in the hands of exact persons of a particular weight.

All of this has been taken in mind in respect of the negotiation at the political level, and all of the Zionist and Egyptian blackmail accompanied with the negotiation did not weaken the factions or pushed them to retreat from their demands; this was clear in the failure to complete Shalit deal more than once.

2. The failure of Zionist security:

The success of the security of the factions on the issue of Shalit had a great effect on the failure of the Zionist security plans that attempt to obtain any information and catch any error committed by the factions to kidnap the paper of power which is Shalit to force the factions to back down on several levels (in terms of security and political):

  • The demands of the deal.
  • Calm.
  • Dialogue.

Methods used by the Zionist intelligence services in the search for Shalit:

The enemy intelligence agencies did not spare any mean to use in order to access Shalit, or access any piece of information may tell them his whereabouts, whether military, political, economic or security:

First, Military:

• limited military operations along the border strip, as happened more than once in the limited incursions, whether in the southern Gaza Strip, in the center or in the north, as well as the aerial bombardment of vital places such as government institutions, power transformers and bridges .. And others.

• The recent war in Gaza, which lasted for a period of 23 days where the restoration of Shalit was part of its objectives.

Second, Politically:

• the abduction of political leaders, deputies and ministers of the Hamas in the West Bank which was repeated twice; first after the capture operation, and the other after the failure of the deal recently.

• The threat of assassination of leaders of the factions, including Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh.

• The political movement under Egyptian mediator to complete an exchange deal between the factions and the occupation, and to link this file with the files of siege and calm.

Third, Economically:

• The imposition of a suffocating siege on the people of Gaza Strip by the closure of border crossings around the strip, whether with the Zionist enemy, or with Egypt, and to prevent the introduction of food and raw materials for industry and construction, as well as fuels, including the fuel of the only power plant in Gaza strip.

• Bombing and the destruction of industrial and agricultural facilities through air strikes or ground incursions.

Fourth, security:

• Security operations aim at abducting field military leaders, an example of this (kidnapping attempt of Ammar Msabbeh), (abduction of Mhawish Al-Qadi).

• The use of random telephone calls with the residents of Gaza Strip in an attempt to lure them with money in exchange for information about Shalit.

• The deployment of websites on the Internet to receive information about the captured soldiers in return for high financial rewards.

• Unleashing the collaborators in question, research, survey and observation which reached to discuss the waste dumped in the garbage looking for any information leads to Shalit.